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DOES THE CONSTITUTION PROTECT ECONOMIC
LIBERTY?
RANDY E. BARNETT*

It is my job to defend the proposition that the Court in
Lochner v. New York1 was right to protect the liberty of contract
under the Fourteenth Amendment. I will not be defending its
use of the Due Process Clause2 to reach its result. As I shall ex‐
plain, the Court should have been applying the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.3 Nor will I be contending that the Court
was correct in its conclusion that the maximum‐hours law un‐
der consideration was an unconstitutional restriction on the
liberty of contract.4 Although the statute may well have been
unconstitutional, I will not take the time to evaluate that claim.
Instead, I want to focus on whether the Constitution of the
United States protects economic liberty. To clarify the issue, let
me begin by defining “economic liberty.” I define economic lib‐
erty as the right to acquire, use, and possess private property
and the right to enter into private contracts of one’s choosing. If
the Constitution protects these rights, then the Constitution does
protect economic liberty. The evidence that the Constitution pro‐
tects rights of private property and contract is overwhelming.
Let us begin with the constitutional protection afforded eco‐
nomic liberty at the national level. The Ninth Amendment reads,
“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”5
But what were these “other” rights “retained” by the people? The
evidence shows that this was a reference to natural rights.

* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory, Georgetown University
Law Center. Permission to reproduce and distribute for educational purposes is
hereby granted.
1. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
3. Id.
4. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.

6

Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 35

Consider an amendment drafted by Roger Sherman, who
served with James Madison on the House Select Committee to
draft the Bill of Rights.6 Sherman’s second amendment begins
as follows: “The people have certain natural rights which are re‐
tained by them when they enter into Society . . . .”7 In this pas‐
sage, Sherman uses all the terminology the committee eventu‐
ally employed in the Ninth Amendment—“the people,”
“rights,” and “retained”—and the “rights” “retained” by “the
people” are then explicitly characterized as “natural rights.”
But what was meant by the term “natural rights”? Sherman’s
draft provides some examples: “Such are the rights of Con‐
science in matters of religion; of acquiring property and of pursu‐
ing happiness & Safety; of Speaking, writing and publishing
their Sentiments with decency and freedom; of peaceably as‐
sembling to consult their common good, and of applying to
Government by petition or remonstrance for redress of griev‐
ances.”8 The protection of property is at the heart of this list.
Sherman’s rendition of natural rights was entirely common‐
place. Consider some other examples. Another amendment
proposed in the Senate reads: “That there are certain natural
rights, of which men, when they form a social compact, cannot
deprive or divest their posterity; among which are the enjoy‐
ment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and
safety.”9 Similar provisions were proposed by state ratification
conventions. Virginia offered an identical amendment as its
first proposed amendment.10
Many state constitutions contained similar language. Massa‐
chusetts: “All people are born free and equal, and have certain
natural, essential and unalienable rights; among which may be
reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and lib‐
erties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine,
6. See Roger Sherman’s Draft of the Bill of Rights, in THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE
PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 351 app. A
(Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989).
7. Id. (emphasis added).
8. Id. (emphasis added).
9. 6 DEBATES IN CONGRESS 320 (Gales and Seaton 1838) (emphasis added).
10. See 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION
AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 657 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1830), available at
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwed.html.
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that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.”11 New
Hampshire: “All men have certain natural, essential, and inher‐
ent rights—among which are, the enjoying and defending life
and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property; and, in a
word, of seeking and obtaining happiness.”12 Pennsylvania: “All
men are born equally free and independent, and have certain
natural, inherent and inalienable rights, among which are those
of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing
and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining happiness
and safety.”13 Vermont: “That all men are born equally free and
independent, and have certain natural, inherent, and unalienable
rights, amongst which are the enjoying and defending life and
liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing
and obtaining happiness and safety.”14
All these provisions share the affirmation that the natural,
inherent, and inalienable rights retained by the people include
the rights to acquire, possess, and protect property and the
right to pursue happiness and safety. Today, we would charac‐
terize the right to acquire, use, and possess property as “eco‐
nomic,” while characterizing the right to pursue happiness and
safety as “personal.” But these provisions show that the dis‐
tinction between economic and personal liberty is anachronistic
as applied to the Founding when these unenumerated natural
rights were considered inextricably intertwined.
Of course, like the rest of the Bill of Rights, the Ninth
Amendment only restricts the power of the federal govern‐
ment. What of the States? After the Civil War, the Republicans
in Congress struggled to protect the newly freed slaves in the
South from the Black Codes that Southern states adopted to
reestablish white domination.15 In 1866 Congress enacted the
first Civil Rights Act.16 This Act mandated that:
[All citizens of the United States] of every race and color,
without regard to any previous condition of slavery or in‐
voluntary servitude . . . shall have the same right . . . to make
11. MASS. CONST. art. I, amended by MASS. CONST. art. CVI (emphasis added).
12. N.H. CONST. art. II (emphasis added).
13. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
14. VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, art. I (emphasis added).
15. See generally GARRETT EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN: THE FOURTEENTH AMEND‐
MENT AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL RIGHTS IN POST–CIVIL WAR AMERICA (2006).
16. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27.
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and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and pro‐
ceedings for the security of person and property, as is en‐
joyed by white citizens . . . . 17

Congress identified the civil rights of all persons, whether
white or black, as the rights “to make and enforce con‐
tracts, . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real
and personal property.” At the very core of civil rights in 1866,
therefore, were the economic rights of contract and property,
although as with the Founding it is anachronistic to impose the
modern distinction between economic and personal rights on
that period.
So, where in the Constitution did Congress find the power to
enact the Civil Rights Act protecting the economic rights of
contract and property against infringements by the States? For
many readers, the answer may be surprising: It is the Thir‐
teenth Amendment, the first section of which prohibits “slav‐
ery [or] involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime . . . .”18 And the second section of which gives Congress
the “power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”19
If the argument that the Thirteenth Amendment empowered
Congress to protect the economic rights of contract and prop‐
erty seems strained, it is only because we today forget that
slavery was, first and foremost, an economic system that was
designed to deprive slaves of their economic liberty. The key to
slavery was labor. The fundamental divide between the Slave
Power and abolitionists concerned the ownership of this la‐
bor.20 Could a person be owned as property and be denied the
right to refrain from laboring except on terms contractually
agreed upon? Or did every person own him or herself, with the
inherent right to enter into contracts by which they could ac‐
quire property in return?
17. Id. (emphasis added).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
20. See generally Stanley L. Engerman & Robert A. Margo, Free Labor and Slave
Labor, in FOUNDING CHOICES: AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1790S at 291
(Douglas Irwin & Richard Sylla eds., 2010); Jonathan A. Glickstein, Poverty is Not
Slavery: American Abolitionists and the Competitive Labor Market, in ANTISLAVERY
RECONSIDERED: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE ABOLITIONISTS 195 (Lewis Perry &
Michael Fellman eds., 1979).
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Republican adherents of “free labor” held the second of these
views.21 Therefore by abolishing slavery, Republicans in Congress
maintained that the Thirteenth Amendment ipso facto empow‐
ered them to protect the economic liberties that slavery had for so
long denied, in particular, the “right . . . to make and enforce con‐
tracts, . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real
and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of person and property . . . .”22
This defense of the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act
under the Thirteenth Amendment can be simplified as follows:
The Thirteenth Amendment prohibited slavery and the opposite
of slavery is liberty. Any unwarranted restrictions on liberty—
whether personal or economic—are simply partial “incidents”
of slavery.23 Therefore, Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment
empowered Congress to protect any citizen from unjust restric‐
tions on liberty.
Defending the Civil Rights Act in Congress, Michigan Sena‐
tor Jacob Howard noted about a slave:
He owned no property, because the law prohibited him. He
could not take real or personal estate either by sale, by grant,
or by descent or inheritance. He did not own the bread he
earned and ate . . . .
Now, sir, it is not denied that this relation of servitude be‐
tween the former negro slave and his master was actually
severed by this amendment. But the absurd construction
now enforced upon it leaves him without family, without
property, without the implements of husbandry, and even
without the right to acquire or use any instrumentalities of
carrying on the industry of which he may be capable . . . .24

In sum, by abolishing the economic system of slavery, the Thir‐
teenth Amendment empowered Congress to protect the eco‐
nomic system of free labor and the underlying rights of prop‐
erty and contract that defined this system.

21. See Michael Kent Curtis, Two Textual Adventures: Thoughts on Reading Jeffrey
Rosen’s Paper, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1269, 1285 (1998).
22. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27.
23. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441 (1968).
24. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 504 (1866) (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard).
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To the dismay of Congressional Republicans, President An‐
drew Johnson vetoed the Civil Rights Act.25 In his lengthy veto
message, Johnson, a Tennessee Democrat, conceded that the civil
rights identified in the Act “are, by Federal as well as State laws,
secured to all domiciled aliens and foreigners, even before the
completion of the process of naturalization . . . .”26 But he never‐
theless protested that this claim of congressional power “must sap
and destroy our federative system of limited powers and break
down the barriers which preserve the rights of the States.”27 In
response to Johnson’s states’ rights argument, super‐majorities in
both the House and Senate overrode his veto.28 Congress then
proposed the Fourteenth Amendment to constitutionalize the
rights protected by the Civil Rights Act—and more.29
The privileges or immunities of citizens protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment were not limited to the natural rights
enumerated in the Civil Rights Act; they also included the
personal rights of American citizens enumerated in the origi‐
nal Bill of Rights.30 Further, the Fourteenth Amendment did
not adopt the Civil Rights Act’s anti‐discrimination lan‐
guage.31 Instead, the Amendment protected the privileges or
immunities of any citizen, whether white or black, male or
female, from any abridgment whatsoever, not merely from
discrimination. And because Democrats in southern states,
who viciously attacked the Civil Rights Act, were eventually
going to resume their seats in Congress, Republicans sought

25. President Andrew Johnson, Veto of the Civil Rights Bill (Mar. 27, 1866), avail‐
able at http://wps.prenhall.com/wps/media/objects/107/109768/ch16_a2_d1.pdf.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 233 (1988).
29. See id. at 70–71. But cf. EPPS, supra note 15, at 164–83 (explaining how the leg‐
islative origin and movement of a constitutional amendment paralleled rather
than succeeded the origin and movement for the Civil Rights Act). According to
this chronology, each initiative employed a different means to accomplish the
same end of protecting the fundamental rights of freedman and Republicans in
the South. Still, Epps does not deny that the passage of the Fourteenth Amend‐
ment was motivated, at least in part, by the need to respond to Johnson’s veto.
30. See McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3058–88 (2010) (Thomas, J., con‐
curring in the judgment). See generally MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL
ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1987).
31. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, with The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27.
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to place these guarantees beyond the power of any future
Congress to repeal.32
But what the Republicans in Congress giveth, the Supreme
Court taketh away. Just five years after the Fourteenth Amend‐
ment’s enactment, the Court in The Slaughter‐House Cases33—by a
vote of five‐to‐four—effectively gutted the Privileges or Immuni‐
ties Clause by limiting its scope to purely national rights, such as
the right of a citizen to be protected while traveling on the high
seas; it also adopted Andrew Johnson’s narrow reading of the
Thirteenth Amendment.34 Ever since, the economic liberties pro‐
tected by the Constitution have been questioned by those who
would put the economic powers of the slaveholder into the
hands of Congress and state legislatures.
Of course, these constitutionally protected economic liber‐
ties can still be reasonably regulated. After all, even the First
Amendment’s rights of freedom of speech and assembly are
subject to reasonable “time, place, and manner” regulations.35
As Justice Bradley explained in his dissenting opinion in
Slaughter‐House, “[t]he right of a State to regulate the conduct
of its citizens is undoubtedly a very broad and extensive one,
and not to be lightly restricted. But there are certain funda‐
mental rights which this right of regulation cannot infringe. It
may prescribe the manner of their exercise, but it cannot subvert
the rights themselves.”36
By eliminating the Privileges or Immunities Clause, while
distorting the meaning of the Due Process and Equal Protec‐
tion Clauses—along with ignoring the original meaning of
the Ninth Amendment—the Supreme Court has deprived
Americans of these express protections of all their natural
rights, including their rights “to make and enforce contracts”
and “to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real
and personal property.”37 But thanks to the foresight of men
like Virginia’s James Madison, who conceived the Ninth

32. See EPPS, supra note 15, at 164–83.
33. 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
34. Id. at 69–70, 79.
35. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575–76 (1941).
36. Slaughter‐House, 83 U.S. at 114 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
37. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27.
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Amendment,38 and Ohio’s John Bingham, who drafted the
Privileges or Immunities, Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,39 these protections of
our natural rights—both personal and economic—remain a
part of the written Constitution of the United States. They
can be denied, they can be disparaged, and they can be
abridged, but they have not been repealed.

38. See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 235–42 (2005).
39. See EPPS, supra note 15, at 164–83.

